Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive
Branch Options to Avoid Default
Steven L. Schwarczt
In a prior article,' I examined how a US. debt default might occur and
analyzed its potential consequences. Even a mere "technical" default, such as
temporarily missing an interest or principal payment, "almost certainly
[would] have large systemic effects with long-term adverse consequences for
Treasury finances and the U.S. economy."2 The most plausible U.S. debt
default would in fact be a technical default-a temporary default due to
Congress'sfailure to raise the federal debt ceiling.3 The US. Department of
the Treasury recently cautioned that such a default, which became a nearreality in October 2013, could be disastrous: "In the event that a debt limit
impasse were to lead to a default, it could have a catastrophiceffect on notjust
financial markets but also on job creation, consumer spending and economic
growth. '
This Featurefocuses on that potential cause of a U.S. debt default-a
technical default resulting from Congress's failure to raise the federal debt
ceiling-and analyzes how the executive branch of the federal government
might be able to prevent such a default regardless of the Congress's
inclinations. My analysis assumes that Congressfails to raise the debt ceiling
due to political paralysis, political gamesmanship, procedural voting
impediments, or any reason other than a clear desire to force the nation to
default on its debt; that more U.S. debt is coming due than can be refinanced
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under the applicable debt limit; and that the executive branch is searchingfor
ways to avoid a debt default.
To that end, the Introduction provides historical context, explaining the
debt ceiling as a means of delegating certain congressional borrowing
authority to the executive and discussing the ongoing potentialfor debt-ceiling
showdowns. PartI examines the publicly discussed optionsfor avoiding a US.
debt default, including the argument that the President has implicit borrowing
authorityunder the FourteenthAmendment and that the executive branch could
prioritize its payment obligations.5 PartII also explains why these options are
not generally consideredviable.
Part II of the Featureproposes alternative optionsfor avoiding default,
applying structured finance modeling to federal debt. In the first of these
options, a special-purpose entity (SPE) would issue debt that is not full faith
and credit to the U.S. government per se and would use the proceeds to make a
back-to-back loan to an executive-branch agency or entity on a nonrecourse
but secured basis. In the second of these options, the special-purpose entity
would use the proceeds to purchase income-generatingfinancial assets, such
as rights to the future payment of specified tax revenues. PartIII also provides
a detailed legal analysis of these alternativeoptions.
Finally, Part Ill explains how credit rating agencies and investors would
likely view these alternative options. Part III also discusses how these options
should be constrainedto prevent theirpotential abuse.
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(discussing that
"economists and investors have quietly begun to explore the options the White House might have in the
event Congress fails to act" on raising the federal debt limit).
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Introduction
Under the Constitution, Congress has exclusive authority to issue debt "on
the credit of the United States." 6 Congress has long delegated some of that
power to the Treasury Department. 7 To avoid having to micromanage the
Treasury Department's debt issuances, Congress created the public debt
limit -colloquially known as the "debt ceiling"-within which the Treasury
9
Department has virtually unfettered debt-issuance authority.
As government costs increase, the debt ceiling may need to be raised to
finance those costs.10 A substantial component of annual U.S. government
expenditures is the payment of debt service-principal and interest-on
maturing Treasury securities.I Congress thus can threaten a default by refusing
to raise the debt ceiling, creating the potential for a debt ceiling showdown
between Congress and the executive branch. Such a showdown will loom large,
for example, if Congress and the President are at loggerheads on spending and
Congress uses the debt ceiling as leverage to try to extract spending cuts-a

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2 (providing that "The Congress shall have Power ... To
6.
borrow Money on the credit of the United States").
7. E.g.,
I
Cong.
Ch.
12
(Sept.
2,
1789),
1
Stat.
65,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/act-congress.aspx.
8.
31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012).
See Schwarcz, supranote 1,at 8.
9.
10.

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET FOR

FIsCAL YEAR 2014 tbl. 1.1 (2014) (indicating that the U.S. government is projected to operate at a deficit,
albeit shrinking, through fiscal year 2018; if the government collects less in total than it spends, it must
increase its level of debt overall).
11.
Cf id. at tbl.3.1 (observing that "Net Interest" as a percentage of total "U.S.
Government Outlays," or spending, has historically been 9% on average from 1940-2012, and is
expected to fall to around 6% in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 before gradually rising to over 10% in fiscal
year 2018). For an explanation of Treasury securities, see infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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scenario that has occurred many times, including during both the Clintonl2 and
Obama Administrations.' 3 This type of showdown can occur frequently
because the federal government, like most governments worldwide, routinely
depends on borrowing new money-often above the debt limit-to repay (i.e.,
refinance) its maturing debt.14 One might ask why governments routinely
depend on borrowings to repay maturing debt. The answer is cost: using shortterm debt to fund long-term projects is attractive because, if managed to avoid a
default, such financing tends to lower the cost of borrowing. The interest rate
on short-term debt is usually lower than that on long-term debt because, other
things being equal, it is easier to assess a borrower's ability to repay in the short
term than in the long term, and long-term debt carries greater interest-rate
risk.
In October 2013, for example, the Obama Administration warned that if
the debt limit were not raised, the United States would shortly default on its
debt. Congress agreed to a temporary increase until February 2014,1 at which
time it postponed the problem by suspending the debt limit for another year.Is
The problem, though, is not limited to these dates. As mentioned, the risk that a
debt-ceiling showdown could trigger a debt default has been historically
significant. Moreover, it will continue to be significant, because the rising
federal government debt load will inevitably make future debt-ceiling increases
necessary. 19
I. Extant Options for Avoiding Default
Principally, two options have been reported for avoiding a U.S. debt
default: (A) that the President has implicit authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution to borrow to avoid such a default; and (B) that
12. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. See also Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 8
(discussing other debt-ceiling showdowns).
13.
See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
14.
See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 5.
15.
Id.
16.
The Treasury Department estimated that if the debt ceiling were not raised by
October 17, 2013, it would have only $30 billion in cash, which would be used up in days. See Annie
Lowrey, Treasury Puts a Date on When Cash May Run Out: Oct. 17, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/business/treasury-wams-of-potential-default-by-mid-october.html.
17.
The increase, which was implemented by temporarily suspending the debt ceiling,
expired on February 7, 2014. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, 127 Stat. 558
(2013).
18. See Wesley Lowery, Congress Approves Increase in Debt Limit After Dramatic
vote, WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (Feb. 12, 2014, 4:05 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/pos
t-politics/wp/2014/02/12/senate-to-vote-on-debt-limit-increase-vote-early-this-aftemoon.
19.
Cf Joe Nocera, Why the Debt Ceiling Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/opinion/nocera-why-the-debt-ceiling-matters.html (reporting that
"U.S. finances are on a troubling long-term trajectory [in part because the] government has promised
more to future retirees than taxpayers seem willing to pay"). Congress constitutionally cannot raise the
debt ceiling an unlimited amount, even in the unlikely event it were politically willing to do so.
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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the executive branch could prioritize payments, paying its maturing debt first,
to avoid default. This Part considers these options in turn, along with other lessdiscussed methods.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Option
According to this option, the President may "invoke authority under the
[Fourteenth] Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution and order the "government
to keep borrowing." 20 The rationale for this implicit authority is that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from questioning the
"validity" of its public debt.21 This option is reported to have been "endorsed
by former President Bill Clinton during an earlier debt standoff in 201 1.",22
Two legal scholars have argued that it is one of the "least unconstitutional"
options.23
The problem, however, is that this option may not be constitutional at all,
and even if it is, the resulting uncertainty will be costly. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not explicitly authorize the executive branch to borrow to
avoid default. Nor does it appear to provide any implicit authorization: its
provision prohibiting the government from questioning the "validity" of its
public debt was historically included solely to prevent a southern Democratic
majority from repudiating Civil War debts. 24
Although that provision has been held to apply generally, not just to Civil
War debts,25 it is doubtful that "question[ing]" the "validity" of U.S. debt
includes defaulting on such debt.26 Michael McConnell has lucidly explained
the distinction: "Default is not the same as repudiation. If Congress repudiated
the debt, it would be declaring that the debt is not owed. If Congress defaulted
on the debt, the [debt] would still be owed; it would simply go (in part)
unpaid." 27 The Obama Administration itself has announced that it does "not

20.
Schwartz & Savage, supra note 5.
21.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §4.
22.
Schwartz & Savage, supranote 5.
23.
Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1175, 1194 (2012). Some scholars have criticized the framing of options as "least unconstitutional,"
arguing that it is conceptually nonsensical to talk about the best (or least bad) way to violate the
Constitution. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Experts See Potential Ways Outfor Obama in Debt Ceiling Maze,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/experts-see-potential-ways-o
ut-for-obama-in-debt-ceiling-maze.html.
24.
See Michael W. McConnell, Origins of the Fiscal Constitution, in 15 U.S.
GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT? 45, 49-50 (Franklin Allen et al.
eds., 2012),
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edulFIC/FICPress/usdebt.pdf; Stuart McCommas, Note, Forgotten but Not
Lost: The Original Public Meaning of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 VA. L. REV. 1291,
1325 (2013) ("Under the original public meaning of [Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment], only
legal action directly repudiating the federal debt is unconstitutional.").
25.
See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935).
26.
1 discuss this at length in Schwarcz, supranote 1, at 19-22.
27.
McConnell, supra note 24, at 50.
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believe that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the President the power to ignore
the debt ceiling-period."28
Debt borrowed by the federal government in violation of the debt ceiling
would therefore be, at best, of uncertain constitutional validity. Any such
borrowing could therefore have adverse consequences. For example, it could
lead to a threat of impeachment from members of Congress opposed to such
borrowing.29 Almost certainly, any such borrowing would be litigated up to the
Supreme Court. 30 Furthermore, and of greater practical importance, investors in
debt securities evidencing the borrowing would likely demand a significant
discount to compensate for the risk that the securities would be
unenforceable.
B. The Prioritization-of-PaymentsOption
Under an alternative approach, the executive branch would try to prioritize
its payments, paying the maturing debt first in order to avoid default.32 It is
uncertain, though, whether the executive branch has legal authority to pick and
choose which creditors to pay. 33 The authority to pay all debts of the United
States is constitutionally vested in Congress. 34 Congress has delegated the
execution of that authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, who is required by
law to make all payments on government obligations as they come due.35 An

28.
Jay Carney, White House Press Sec'y, Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/03/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-camey- 10313.
29.
Schwartz & Savage, supra note 5 (noting congressional Republicans' opposition to
this method).
30.
There is a chance, however, that the Court would refuse to hear the case, deeming
any dispute between the executive branch and Congress over unauthorized borrowing a nonjusticiable
political question. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (enumerating the factors
relevant to the question whether a particular suit should be dismissed as a political question); Tara L.
Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J.
LEGIS. 1, 78 (2002) ("Courts will resolve separation of powers issues; however, they will not mediate
'political questions' or disputes that are strictly between the executive and legislative branches."
(citations omitted)). But see Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012) ("The Judicial Branch
appropriately exercises [its substantive] authority, including in a case such as this, where the question is
whether Congress or the Executive is 'aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch."'
(citations omitted)); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, HistoricalPractice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1131 n.122 (2013) (citing Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at
1427) ("The Supreme Court also recently signaled a narrow view of the political question doctrine, even
in the area of foreign affairs.").
31.
Schwartz & Savage, supra note 5 (reporting that "specialists on Wall Street said
questions about the legality of [such debt securities] might cause potential buyers to eschew them").
32.
Id. This option, called the paid prioritization effort, was included in the House of
Representatives' Fall 2013 Continuing Resolution. See Pub. L. No. 113-46, 127 Stat. 558 (2013).
33.
Nocera, supra note 19 (reporting that "the Treasury Department says it does not
have the authority to pick and choose which creditors to pay"); see Schwarcz, supranote 1, at 32.
34.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the
Debts .... ).
35.
31 U.S.C. § 321(a)(3) (2012).

274

Executive Branch Options to Avoid Default
attempt by the House of Representatives to enable the Treasury Secretary to
prioritize which obligations to pay failed in the Senate.36
Even if the executive does have the authority to choose which creditors to
pay first, prioritizing payments would be "logistically forbidding" because the
government uses "an ancient [payment] system that wasn't designed for debtceiling damage control". The Treasury Department would have to choose
which among "approximately 80 million separate payments per month" to
pay. Moreover, it is doubtful that prioritizing payments, if otherwise feasible,
would be sufficient. In the October 2013 debt-ceiling showdown, for example,
analysts estimate that prioritizing payments would have been unlikely to buy
more than two weeks of time. 39
C. Other Extant Options
Other options discussed for avoiding a U.S. debt default have been more
fanciful. The most plausible, perhaps, is the $1 trillion platinum coin proposal.
Congress has authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to mint platinum coins in
any size, shape, and most importantly, denomination. 40 The Treasury Secretary
therefore could mint $1 trillion platinum coins, deposit them into the Treasury
Department's account at the Federal Reserve Bank, and possibly issue warrants
and checks on the newly available funds without violating the debt limit.41
Though outlandish on its face, this idea has drawn support from Paul
42
Krugman, among others. Some legal scholars have observed, however, that
the $1 trillion platinum coin proposal fails as a pragmatically viable solution
because it is so "cartoonish and desperate that it could undermine faith in the

36.
The Full Faith and Credit Act, H.R. 807, 113th Cong. (2013), was passed by the
House of Representatives but died in the Senate.
37.
Editorial, Congress's Blueprint for Global Catastrophe, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK.,
Oct. 10, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-1 0/bloomberg-view-congresss-blueprint
-for-global-catastrophe; see also Schwartz & Savage, supra note 5 (questioning the government's ability
to prioritize its payments).
38.
Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog
/Pages/Secretary-Geithner-Sends-Debt-Limit-Letter-to-Congress- 1-14-13.aspx.
39.
Cf Schwartz & Savage, supra note 5 (reporting that on November 1, 2013, "nearly
$70 billion has to be paid for Social Security, Medicare, military paychecks and other obligations").
40.
31 U.S.C. § 5112(k) (2012) ("The Secretary may mint and issue platinum bullion
coins and proof platinum coins in accordance with such specifications, designs, varieties, quantities,
denominations, and inscriptions as the Secretary, in the Secretary's discretion, may prescribe from time
to time.").
41.
Cf Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011,
10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011 /OPINION/07/28/balkin.obama.options (outlining, though taking
a neutral stance on the merits of, such a mint-and-deposit approach).
42.
See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Coins Against Crazies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/1l/opinion/krugman-coins-against-crazies.html
("[N]o matter how
offbeat or silly it may sound .... Mint that coin!"); Paul Krugman, Rage Against the Coin, N.Y. TIMES:
CONSCIENCE OF ALIBERAL (Jan. 8, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/rage
-against-the-coin (declaring such an approach to be "economically harmless").
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government's ability to repay its obligations" and would create market
uncertainty. 43 Commentators are also worried about the proposal's political
44
consequences.
II. Alternative Options for Avoiding Default
Because of the legal and practical impediments of the foregoing options, I
next propose and analyze possible alternative options for avoiding default. 45
These options attempt to bypass traditional borrowing limitations by applying
structured finance modeling to federal debt. Structured finance is an essential
basis of corporate finance, and an increasingly important basis of state and
46
municipal finance. Its use in federal public finance has heretofore been
minimal, however, probably because Treasury securities already bear extremely
low interest rates.
Each of the structured finance options proposed would use an existing or
newly created special-purpose entity (SPE) to issue debt that is not full faith
and credit to the U.S. government per se. By analogy, many states raise the
majority of their funding through SPEs, as opposed to directly issuing general
obligation bonds.47 One of the reasons they do so is to borrow without violating
48
archaic state-constitution-mandated debt ceilings. This Feature's structured
finance options have a similar goal: to enable the federal government to borrow
without violating the archaic-or, at least, politically dysfunctionalborrowing constraints under the U.S. Constitution.
The analysis below begins by examining two structured finance optionsa back-to-back borrowing option and an asset-sale option-that the executive
branch could use, absent congressional authorization, to raise funding to repay
maturing federal debt (thereby avoiding default). It also provides a detailed
legal analysis of these options. The following Part examines how rating
agencies and investors would likely view the SPE debt issued to raise that
funding. 49 Finally, I examine how the options could potentially be abused, and
how to protect against such abuse.50

43.
Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 23, at 1231.
44.
See, e.g., G.I., Platinomics: The Economics of the Platinum Coin Option,
ECONOMIST: FREE EXCH. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/01/econo
mics-platinum-coin-option.
45.
For more information, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law & Bus., Duke
Univ. Sch. of Law, Lecture on Legal and Economics Challenges and Consequences of a U.S. Debt
Default, Stanford Law School (Oct. 17, 2013).
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities
46.
in Public Finance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 369 (2012) (describing the use of special-purpose vehicles in U.S.
municipal finance).
47.
Id. at 370.
48.
Id. at 375-76.
49.
See infra Section Il.A.
50.
See infra Section III.B.
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A. The Back-to-Back Borrowing Option
Under this option, an SPE would issue debt securities in amounts needed
to repay maturing federal debt. The SPE would then lend the proceeds to an
executive branch agency or entity on a back-to-back maturity basis. As a
somewhat parallel precedent to this structure, the Federal Reserve very
successfully created and used SPEs and back-to-back lending on an emergency
basis, in 2008, to surmount statutory lender-of-last-resort restrictions under the
Federal Reserve Act.51
Back-to-Back Borrowing Structure
INVESTORS

Federal Government

(Executive Branch Agency or
Entity)

This structure is roughly analogous to a synthetic collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) structure, in which an SPE issues securities to investors and
then uses the proceeds to generate or acquire income-producing loans that serve
to support ultimate repayment to the investors. 52 The CLO market is
increasingly important and robust. 53
I next examine this structure from a legal standpoint, focusing first on
creating an SPE to issue debt securities and thereafter on the SPE's back-toback on-lending of the proceeds of the debt issuance. I later examine this
structure from the standpoint of rating agencies and investors.

51.

See Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 373 n.17.

52.

See, e.g., 1 JASON H.P. KRAVITT ET AL., SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS

§

4.05 (2007).
See, e.g., Kristen Haunss, Wall Street PropsCLO Boom as Rules Lift Costs: Credit
53.
Markets, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 26, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-26
/wall-street-props-clo-boom-as-rules-lift-costs-credit-markets.html.
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1. Creating an SPE to Issue Debt Securities
A threshold question for this structure-and also for the asset-sale
structure 54 -is whether the executive branch has the power and authority,
absent explicit congressional delegation,55 to create an SPE that could issue
debt securities. Although the standalone power of the executive branch to
create corporate entities has never been directly tested in the courts,56 history
(and logic) suggests that it has discretion to create such entities for the purpose
of executing legislation passed by Congress. The executive branch's authority,
acting through the Treasury Department, to finance federal government
operations and to pay the government's financial obligations should provide
sufficient power to create a debt-issuing SPE that is not itself, and that does not
act as, an agency of the federal government. The mere failure of Congress to
raise the debt ceiling should not undermine that authority.57
Thus, through the issuance of a presidential executive order, the executive
should have the power and authority to create a nongovernmental SPE that
could issue debt securities. Such power and authority are implicitly delegated
by Congress to the Secretary of the Treasury, who is responsible to pay
principal and interest on federal debt. As a result, the creation of such a debtissuing SPE would not violate Congress's restrictions on executive branch
creation of corporations under the Government Corporation Control Act
(GCCA).
i. The Power to Create a Debt-Issuing SPE is Implicit in Congress's
Delegation of Responsibility to Pay Federal Debt
The Secretary of the Treasury is statutorily tasked with paying Treasury
58
securities. U.S. presidents have the power to issue presidential executive
orders to help members of the executive branch fulfill their responsibilities. 59

54.
See infra Subsection II.B. 1.
55.
Congress itself clearly has the power to create SPEs in furtherance of legitimate
governmental goals. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, under the authority of the Constitution's
Necessary and Proper Clause).
56.
In the early 1940s, an executive branch agency, the Farm Security Administration,
created several corporations to circumvent its own lack of statutory authority to purchase land. The
inquiry into the legality of that agency's actions was split along political lines with the Attorney General
approving, and the Comptroller General disapproving. 3 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, pt. B,

§3

(2008), 2008 WL 6969355, at *4.

57.
See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
31 U.S.C. § 3123(b) (2012) (providing in part that "[t]he Secretary of the Treasury
58.
shall pay interest due or accrued on the public debt").
59.
See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (recognizing the President's
authority to issue executive orders); see also Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders
and Other PresidentialDirectives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 276-87 (2001) (discussing the sources of
presidential authority for and providing a brief history of executive orders); John E. Noyes, Executive
Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 837, 841 (1981) ("The
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The President therefore could issue an executive order directing the Secretary
of the Treasury to create an SPE to issue debt and to use the proceeds to help
pay maturing Treasury securities. The executive order would represent a
resolution of ostensibly inconsistent congressional directives-on the one hand,
to pay outstanding federal debt and, on the other hand, not to raise the debt
ceiling-and would have the force of law, at least until Congress specifically
says otherwise. The executive branch generally has substantial discretion in
interpreting its obligations as defined by Congress, and its interpretation of
legislation is usually afforded substantial deference.60
Congress theoretically could repeal an executive order creating a debtissuing SPE for the purpose of avoiding default, but that would require a vetobypassing supermajority, which is unlikely to occur. Executive orders are also
subject to legal challenges, but those challenges are almost never successful. Of
the thousands of executive orders, 62 only two appear to have been successfully
challenged in court.
The first successful challenge occurred in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer,63 in which the steel industry persuaded the Supreme Court to
overturn President Truman's seizure through executive order of the entire U.S.
steel industry. Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown established the
principles for analyzing the validity of executive orders, articulating three

President's power to issue executive orders derives from the Constitution or from federal statute."
(citations omitted)); see generally John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders:
Glimmerings of Autopolesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333 (2010) (supplying a detailed
account of the legal, historical, and philosophical underpinnings of executive orders).
60.
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) ("Interpreting a law enacted
by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law.");
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We have long
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."); see also Eric Posner, The President Has the Power to
Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, SLATE (Jan. 4, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
and politics/view from chicago/2013/01/debt ceilingjpresident obama has the power to raise the
debt limit without.html (arguing that in raising the debt ceiling the President could rely on his
emergency powers" or his administrative power to resolve conflicting congressional directives).
61.
See, e.g., Branum, supra note 30, at 71 (observing that "overturning a presidential
directive requires more than enactment of legislation according to the normal legislative processes. It is
not enough for Congress to have enough votes to simply pass a statute overturning the presidential
order. It must also have enough votes to overcome the probable presidential veto"). In other words,
repealing a law-and an executive order is treated as law-requires the same process as enacting a law,
so if the repeal is vetoed by the President it would require a supermajority vote to override. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Cf Noyes, supra note 59, at 846 & 846 n.38 (indicating that when "Congress ... has
acted[] to invalidate or repeal 'incorrect' executive branch interpretations of its statutes," it has done so
by passing legislation).
62.
As of January 20, 2014, U.S. presidents had issued 15,220 executive orders (of
which 168 were issued by President Obama). Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders, in THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(John
T.
Woolley
& Gerhard
Peters
eds.,
1999-2014),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
63.
343 U.S. 579 (1952). The other was Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (invalidating an executive order because it was preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act).
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classifications of presidential power. 4 The Supreme Court has since adopted
Justice Jackson's opinion, and his tripartite analytical framework, as controlling
precedent. 65
Under Justice Jackson's analysis in Youngstown, the scope of presidential
authority varies directly with the degree of congressional authorization for the
action in question. The closer the President is to the will of Congress, the
stronger the presumption that the presidential action is constitutionally valid.
As it becomes less clear whether the President is acting consistent with
congressional will, the more likely it is that the President lacks the
constitutional authority to act. Justice Jackson identified three zones of
presidential power, ranging from the least vulnerable to judicial challenge to
the most vulnerable to judicial challenge.
In the first category, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate."66 An action "executed by the President pursuant to an Act of
Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions . . . and the

burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." 67 In
other words, an executive order supported by an express or implied
congressional directive is presumed to be constitutionally valid. In the second
category,
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test
of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
68
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.

Most executive orders

appear to fall

within this category of the

Youngstown framework, which embraces all the circumstances where it is
unclear whether the President is acting consistent with congressional will.

64.
343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Even though Youngstown primarily
concerned the President's authority to act in the area of foreign affairs, "Justice Jackson's account of the
distribution of executive and congressional powers in Youngstown Steel applies equally in foreign and
domestic affairs." Detlev Vagts & Anne-Marie Burley, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 416 (1992)
(reviewing Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990)).

65.
See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) ("Justice Jackson's familiar
tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action."); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981) (relying on Justice Jackson's analysis in evaluating the validity
of unilateral presidential action).
66.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
67.
Id. at 637.
68.
Id.
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In the third category, "When the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."69 An executive order will
fall within this category only when it is clear that the order is flatly inconsistent
with congressional will and relates to matters over which Congress has at least
some constitutional authority. 70 In Youngstown, Justice Jackson deemed
President Truman's seizure of the steel industry to be in the third category71
and ultimately voted with the majority in striking down the executive order.72
An executive order directing the Treasury Department to create an SPE
for purposes of avoiding a debt default-provided, as discussed below, that the
SPE does not violate the GCCA 73 -might arguably fall within the first zone of
the Youngstown framework. Because Congress has delegated debt payment responsibility to the Secretary of the Treasury, the President would be acting pursuant to an implied authorization of Congress, so his authority should be at its
maximum. Moreover, by helping avoid the serious adverse economic consequences (probably including a severe recession) of a default, that executive order should also be consistent with the "general tenor" of the statutory regime
under which the executive branch manages the economy. That consistency provides an independent basis for concluding that the executive order might fall
within the first zone of the Youngstown framework.7 4
An executive order directing the Treasury Department to create an SPE
for purposes of avoiding a debt default at least should fall within the second
zone of the Youngstown framework, where the President acts upon his own
independent powers in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority. As explained below in more detail, Congress's failure to raise the
debt ceiling represents "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence" that,
"as a practical matter, enable[s] . . . measures on independent presidential

responsibility" 75 -i.e., preventing a government default and its disastrous
consequences. Congressional refusal to act is generally insufficient to put the
President and Congress directly at odds with one another under Youngstown. 76

69.
Id. at 637-38.
70. Id. at 639.
71.
See id. at 640 ("This leaves the [steel] seizure to be justified only by the severe tests
under the third grouping, where . . . we can sustain the President only by holding that [the seizure] is
within his domain and beyond control by Congress.").
72. Id. at 655.
73.
See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
74.
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (finding a presidential
executive agreement to fall within zone one of the Youngstown framework despite evidence that
Congress informally opposed the agreement because the executive agreement was consistent with the
"general tenor" of the statutory regime allowing unilateral presidential action in times of national
emergency to respond to hostile acts of foreign states).
75.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
76.
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 93 (2002) ("[C]ourts tend to avoid exploring the President's constitutional foreign affairs
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The argument that Congress's failure to raise the debt ceiling represents
"congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence" presumes that such failure
does not express a clear desire to force the nation to default on its debt (in
which case the President's power would fall within the third zone of the
Youngstown framework, creating a strong presumption of unconstitutionality).
That presumption is supported by the facts. For example, the Majority Leader,
Majority Whip, and two additional senior senators have demanded, in a private
letter to the President, that he "take any lawful steps" to avoid default,
including "without Congressional approval, if necessary."77 The Full Faith and
Credit Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives but died in the
Senate, provided that "[i]n carrying out the statutory responsibilities to 'support
of the public credit' and 'managing the public debt' the [Treasury] Secretary
shall take all necessary actions to ensure all obligations of the United States
Government with regard to debt held by the public are fully discharged when
due."78 Even members of Congress who have opposed raising the debt ceiling
in the past have argued that the executive branch would still be able to take
certain steps to avoid a default.79 Most parties agree, for example, that failure to
raise the debt ceiling would not restrict the Treasury Department's authority to
attempt to prioritize payments to avoid a default.80 Congress's failure to raise
the debt ceiling, in other words, does not limit all possible methods of paying
existing debt, nor does it require a default.
Even if an executive order directing the Treasury Department to create an
SPE for purposes of avoiding a debt default fell within the third zone of the
Youngstown framework, Congress might be unable to persuade the judiciary to
declare the order unconstitutional-in which case, as a practical matter, the
executive order would stand. As discussed above, this issue of executive power
may be deemed a nonjusticiable political question. ' In addition, Congress (or
members of Congress suing individually) may lack Article III standing to

powers-express or implied-instead finding congressional authorization in questionable circumstances
or simply assuming that presidential action should stand as long as Congress is silent."); id. at 144 ("The
Dames & Moore Court interpreted Congress's silence not as its understanding of the scope of the
Executive's constitutional powers, but rather as a legislative authorization or approval of the Executive's
conduct.").
77.
Letter from Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Dick Durbin, Senator, Patty
Murray, Senator & Charles Schumer, Senator, to Barack Obama, President of the United States of
America (Jan. 11, 2013) http://usbudgetalert.com/Letter/ 20to%2OPresident%200bama%2OFrom%20S
ens.%20Reid%2ODurbin%2OMurray%20and%20Schumer%2OUrging%20the%20Consideration%20of
%20Any%2OLawful%2OSteps%20to%2OAvoid%2ODefault.pdf.
78.
H.R. 807, 113th Cong. § 2(3) (2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- 113hr8
07ih/htmlI/BILLS-l l3hr8O7ih.htm.
79.
See, e.g., Nick Wing & Shadee Ashtari, GOP Debt Ceiling Truthers Want You to
Listen to Them, Not The Experts. What Could Go Wrong?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2013)
(quoting
multiple
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/16/gop-debt-ceiling_n 4101364.html
members of Congress making this argument).
See id. (quoting Republican members of Congress arguing that the debt ceiling does
80.
not affect the executive branch's power to prioritize some financial obligations over others).
81.
See supranote 30.
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challenge unilateral executive branch action taken to avoid a default, at least
until it takes an affirmative stance against the President. 82 Only when political
remedies have been exhausted, or congressional votes effectively nullified by
83
executive branch action, will courts recognize legislative standing.
ii. The Power to Create a Debt-Issuing SPE Would Not Violate
Congress's Restrictions on Executive Branch Creation of
Corporations
Under the GCCA, Congress has restricted executive branch power to
create corporations. The GCCA provides in relevant part that "[a]n agency may
establish . . . a corporation to act as an agency only by or under a law of the

United States specifically authorizing the action."8 If the executive order
creating the debt-issuing SPE violates the GCCA, that order-and hence the
SPE created thereunder-would be presumed unconstitutional under the
Youngstown framework.85
It should be feasible, however, to craft the executive order in a way that
does not violate the GCCA. At the outset, the debt-issuing SPE should be organized as an entity that is not a "corporation." Additionally, it should not be
allowed to "act as an agency."
In the financial world, debt-issuing SPEs are routinely organized as
entities that are not corporations to avoid an entity-level corporate tax.87
Typical debt-issuing SPEs are thus organized as limited liability companies
(LLCs), partnerships, and even commercial trusts.88 If the executive order were
to specify that the debt-issuing SPE should be organized in one of those forms,
that alone might be sufficient to avoid the GCCA's application.

See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (holding that a group of
82.
congressmen lacked standing where political remedies, such as passing new legislation, were available);
Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that a group of congressmen lacked
standing to challenge an executive order, and noting "that courts should refrain from interfering in
disputes arising out of the legislative process when a political remedy is available from within that
process").
See Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The
83.
Past, Present, and Future of LegislatorStanding, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 209, 268 (2001) ("For a
legislator to have standing, the [D.C. Circuit] in Campbell [v. Clinton] explained, there must be . . . no
other legislative remedies available to rectify the action by the [President]. This means that whatever had
been done by the [President] cannot be undone by legislative action.").
31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2012).
84.
See supranotes 69-70 and accompanying text.
85.
Depending on politics, Congress could also retroactively approve the creation of the
86.
debt-issuing SPE. That could allow Congress to have its cake (by not raising the debt limit) and eat it too
(by sanctioning the measures taken to avoid default). Of course, some members of Congress might later
regret that approval if they want to again create a debt-ceiling showdown.
87.

See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND

CAPITAL MARKETS § 5.02, at 112-17 (4th ed. 2004).
88.
Id. § 5.02, at 117-27.
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A party attempting to challenge that exemption might argue, however, that
the GCCA's use of the term "corporation" should be broadly construed to mean
any generic "corporate" (i.e., separately existing) entity. Even given that
broader interpretation, however, the debt-issuing SPE would still not be subject
to the GCCA unless it "act[s] as an agency." 89 The SPE should not be acting
"as an agency" if it is either a private entity that acts pursuant to specific
contractual directions90 or a government-owned or controlled entity that does
not engage in the implementation of government policy.91 The debt-issuing
SPEs proposed in Part III should be able to be structured to fall into at least one
of those exempted categories.
It is arguable, though I believe unlikely, that the GCCA itself might even
more explicitly delegate power to the executive branch to create a debt-issuing
SPE. Recall that the GCCA provides that "[a]n agency may establish . . . a

corporation to act as an agency only by or under a law of the United States
specifically authorizing the action." An executive order itself, however, is
"law." The President's executive order, when necessary to enforce a federal
statute, effectively becomes federal law and a part of the laws to which the
statute relates.92 Under this reasoning, an executive order creating a debtpaying SPE would be within the first zone of the Youngstown framework
because the President would be acting pursuant to an express authorization of
Congress.93 The problem with this argument, however, is that it would be
inconsistent with the House Report accompanying the legislation that became
the GCCA, which indicates that the phrase "a law of the United States
specifically authorizing the action" refers to further specific congressional
authorization. 94 Therefore, an "express authorization" argument under the
GCCA is unlikely to be successful.95

89.
31 U.S.C. § 9102.
90.
See, e.g., Varicon Int'l v. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 934 F. Supp. 440, 446-47 (D.D.C.
1996) (concluding that the U.S. Investigations Service was not established to "act as an agency" under
section 9102 of the GCCA because it "appear[ed] to be a private corporation which was awarded a
government contract").
91.
Cf Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 396 (1995) (stating that the
GCCA phrase "acting as an agency" of the United States "was evidently intended to restrict the creation
of all Government-controlled policy-implementing corporations, and not just some of them").
92.
See United States v. Borja, 191 F. Supp. 563 (D. Guam 1961); United States v.
Angcog, 190 F. Supp. 696 (D. Guam 1961). Both of these cases cite to and rely on United States v. J. D.
Streett & Co., 151 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1957), modified sub nom. J. D. Streett & Co. v. United States,
256 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1958). (The modification did not affect that case's conclusions regarding
executive orders.)
That argument could be further reinforced if the Secretary of the Treasury
93.
determines all material aspects of the debt securities issued by the SPE, including "(1) the form,
denomination, maturity, interest rate, and conditions to which the obligations [under those debt
securities] will be subject; (2) the way and time the obligations are issued; and (3) the price for which
the obligations will be sold." 31 U.S.C. § 9108(a) (2012). That determination would follow the GCCA's
prescription that the Secretary of the Treasury make that determination "[b]efore a Government
corporation issues obligations and offers obligations to the public." Id.
94.
That House Report states in relevant part as follows:
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In summary, by issuing an executive order, the President should have at
least implicit power and authority under Youngstown to create an SPE that
could issue debt securities. If organized skillfully, that SPE would not violate
Congress's restrictions on executive branch establishment of corporations
under the GCCA.
2. Lending the Proceeds on a Back-to-Back Basis
The second step of the back-to-back borrowing structure would be for the
SPE to on-lend the proceeds of its issued debt to an executive branch agency or
entity on a back-to-back maturity basis.96 For discussion purposes, this Feature
will refer to that as the "on-lending." The on-lending must be structured in a
way that does not itself create debt that violates the federal debt limit. This
creates a conundrum: how can the on-lending constitutionally avoid the need
for congressional authorization, yet make investors in the SPE's debt securities
comfortable that there will be a reliable and adequate basis of repayment?
The structured finance concept of nonrecourse debt can help to resolve
this conundrum. The term nonrecourse debt is a misnomer; it means debt that
has recourse to collateral consisting of specific assets, not debt that lacks all
recourse. 97 As explained below, nonrecourse on-lending should be both
constitutionally valid and acceptable to investors.
Nonrecourse on-lending should be constitutionally valid because it would
create neither general recourse debt nor debt backed by the full faith and credit
of the U.S. government-and thus the debt created by the on-lending should
,,98
The distinction between general
not be "on the credit of the United States.

The committee does not consider the practices of chartering wholly owned Government
corporations without prior authorization by the Congress ... to be desirable. It believes that all
such corporations should be authorized and chartered under Federal statute. The bill provides
that in the future all corporations which are to be established for the purpose of acting as
agencies or instrumentalities of the United States must be established by act of Congress or
pursuant to an act of Congress specifically authorizing such action.
H.R. Rep. No. 79-856, at 11 (1945).
Another possible argument is that the President is not an "agency" within the
95.
meaning of the GCCA. See 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2012) ("An agency may establish or acquire a corporation
to act as an agency only by or under a law of the United States specifically authorizing the action."). The
GCCA defines "agency" as "a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government,"
and therefore does not explicitly include the President. 31 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). In a different but
somewhat analogous context, the Supreme Court has held that the definition of the term "agency" under
the Administrative Procedure Act does not include the President. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470
(1994). Under this argument, an executive order by the President creating a debt-issuing SPE would not
violate the GCCA.
This related question would be irrelevant to the asset-sale structure because the SPE
96.
in that structure uses the proceeds to purchase financial assets, not to make a loan.
97.
See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "nonrecourse"
debt as "an obligation that can be satisfied only out of the collateral securing the obligation and not out
of the debtor's other assets").
98.
U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2.

285

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 31, 2014

recourse debt of the U.S. government and full-faith-and-credit debt of the U.S.
government is unclear, and the terms might be synonymous. The phrase "fullfaith-and-credit" is not explicitly statutorily defined in the context of U.S.
government debt. 99 Nonetheless, it appears to mean that holders of that debt
have recourse generally to the United States government, and not merely to a
particular government agency, for payment. That interpretation follows from
the fact that federal statutes sometime state that the debt of specific
governmental bodies is guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United
Stateslo and sometime state that such debt is not so guaranteed.o10
Furthermore, general-obligation debt instruments issued by the Treasury
Department,102 including long-term bonds and short-term notes and bills
(collectively, "Treasury securities" or colloquially, "Treasuries"), are generally
understood to be backed by the "full faith and credit of the United States." 03
Nonrecourse on-lending would not create general recourse debt, and thus
would not create full-faith-and-credit debt, if the SPE has recourse only to
collateral consisting of specific assets for repayment. Arguably, that should
avoid the need for congressional authorization of the debt created by the onlending. Though there is no explicit precedent finding that nonrecourse debt is
not "on the credit of the United States," that finding would follow from the
characteristics of the debt. Because nonrecourse debt is payable solely from a
finite source-the specified collateral-it exposes creditors to a real risk of
loss. Those creditors are therefore not making their credit decision based on the
ability of the U.S. government to repay them, nor would the U.S. government
be liable to repay them.
That raises the question, why would investors be prepared to purchase the
SPE's debt securities if they are payable solely from specified collateral? In
answer, the collateral must provide a sufficiently reliable and adequate basis of
repayment to make the investors comfortable. The customary way to

99.
When used to describe Treasury securities and other U.S. government debt, the
phrase "full faith and credit" should not be confused with the "Full Faith and Credit Clause" of Article
IV, Section I of the U.S. Constitution. The latter addresses the duties of U.S. states to respect the "public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
100.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (2012) (in the context of the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), providing that "[tihe full faith and credit of the United States is
pledged to the payment of all amounts which may be required to be paid under any guaranty [of Ginnie
Mae debt] under this subsection").
101.
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 5808(a) (2012) (in the context of the National Natural
Resources Conservation Foundation, providing that "[t]he full faith and credit of the United States shall
not extend to the Foundation"). The phrase "full faith and credit" might have originated in part from the
statutory language of 31 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2012), which states, "[t]he faith of the United States
Government is pledged to pay . . . principal and interest on the obligations . . . issued under this

chapter."
102.
31 U.S.C. §§ 3102-3105 (2012).
103.
Why You Should Consider Treasury Securities for Your Portfolio,
TREASURYDIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/articles/res-invest articles-portfolio 0
604.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
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accomplish that is for the collateral to consist of specific high-quality financial
assets-i.e., assets that are expected to convert to cash.
The most plentiful high-quality financial assets that the federal
government could pledge as collateral would be rights to the future payment of
specified tax revenues. 05 Thus, the SPE could on-lend the proceeds of its debt
issuance to the Treasury Department on a nonrecourse basis. The Treasury
Department would secure repayment of that loan with collateral consisting of
rights to the future payment of specified tax revenues. (The Treasury
Department has statutory authority to receive tax revenues, pursuant to which it
created and oversees the Internal Revenue Service. 0 6 ) The SPE would only
have recourse to those specified revenues,107 if and when they are collected; it
would not have recourse to other tax revenues, nor would it have general
recourse to the Treasury Department or any other part of the U.S. government.
If the federal government can constitutionally borrow solely through
executive branch power in a way that makes investors in the SPE's debt
comfortable that there will be a reliable and adequate basis of repayment, one
might ask what the SPE adds, and whether it would be simpler to omit the SPE
step and have the federal government directly issue nonrecourse debt to
investors. At least part of the answer is that the market is more likely to
understand that SPE-issued debt, as opposed to Treasury Department-issued
debt, is not full recourse to the government. That would reduce the chance of
the debt being viewed as "potentially illegitimate," which "could reduce
in the federal government's commitment to meet its
investor confidence
0
obligations.,"1
B. The Asset-Sale Option
Under this option, an SPE would, as before, issue debt securities in
amounts needed to repay maturing federal debt. The SPE would then pay the
proceeds to an executive branch agency or entity, most likely the Treasury

See infra Section III.A.
104.
The power of the executive branch to give a security interest in assets, such as
105.
rights to the future payment of tax revenues, may well be subject to Congress's broader power to
"dispose of' assets. Cf Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 326 (1942) ("Since the
Constitution places the authority to dispose of public lands exclusively in Congress, the executive's
power to convey any interest in these lands must be traced to Congressional delegation of its authority."
(emphasis added)). The analysis of that executive branch power would therefore be subsumed in this
Feature's analysis of the executive branch's power to sell those assets. See infra notes 112-124 and
accompanying text.
106.
26 U.S.C. § 7801 (2012).
The options I propose do not involve a first call on all tax revenues or a call on tax
107.
revenues for an indefinite period. The tax revenues serving as collateral in the first option, or being
purchased in the second option, are in each case a finite set whose value would not so greatly exceed the
amount of the financing that someone could call into question whether the first option is truly
nonrecourse or the second option is truly a sale.
108.
Buchanan & Dorf, supranote 23, at 1209 n.135.
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Department, to purchase income-generating financial assets such as rights to
the future payment of specified tax revenues.1 09 The SPE's securities would be
repayable from collections on the purchased financial assets. Because only the
SPE, and not the federal government, is borrowing or legally liable for
repayment, this structure would not create debt that could violate the federal
debt limit.

Asset-Sale Structure

This structure is analogous to a standard securitization structure, in which
an SPE issues securities to investors and then uses the proceeds to purchase
income-producing financial assets that serve to support ultimate repayment to
the investors.110 Securitization is a major source of financing both domestically
and worldwide.I
I next examine this structure from a legal standpoint, focusing first on
creating an SPE to issue debt securities and thereafter on the SPE using the
proceeds of the debt issuance to purchase financial assets. I later examine this
structure from the standpoint of rating agencies and investors.

109.
See supra notes 105-106 (discussing the Treasury Department's right to receive
future tax revenues).
110.
SCHWARCZ ET AL., supra note 87, § 1.03, at 6-8.
111.
Cf Huw Jones, Bank of England to Take Fresh Look at Securitization Market,
REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/28/us-boe-regulation-idUSBRE9ARO
LD20131128 (reporting that the Bank of England "may step in to kickstart the securitisation market,
which was discredited by the U.S. subprime crisis but is now seen as a valuable option for financing
business growth").
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1. Creating an SPE to Issue Debt Securities
A threshold question for this structure-as it was for the back-to-back
borrowing structure-is whether the executive branch has the power and
authority to create an SPE that could issue debt securities. The same analysis
and conclusions would apply: that through the issuance of an executive order,
the executive branch should have that power and authority, and that the
creation of such a debt-issuing SPE would not violate Congress's restrictions
on executive branch creation of corporations under the GCCA.
2. Using the Proceeds to Purchase Financial Assets
In the second step of the asset-sale structure, the SPE would use the
proceeds of its issued debt to purchase income-generating financial assets from
an executive branch agency or entity. As before, the most significant type of
executive branch financial assets would appear to be rights to payment of future
tax revenues.
That raises the question of whether the executive branch has the power to
sell financial assets. Regarding power to sell assets generally, the Constitution
provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." 1 l2 The term "other property" is not limited to real property
(i.e., land); it also has been interpreted to include personalty, which would
include financial assets.' 13 Nonetheless, as explained below, Congress already
appears to have delegated sufficient power to the executive branch to sell
financial assets to avoid default by paying maturing Treasury securities.
The Secretary of the Treasury has statutory authority to administer and
enforce the Internal Revenue Code.1 4 Thus, the Secretary of the Treasury has
statutory authority to collect taxes.115 The Secretary of the Treasury also has the
statutory authority and duty to pay Treasury securities.
Implicit in those
authorities and duties, the Secretary of the Treasury should have the power to

112.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
113. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936).
114.
26 U.S.C. § 7801 (2012).
115.
31 U.S.C. § 321(a)(6) (2012) (providing that the "Secretary of the Treasury shall
collect receipts").
116.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3327 (2012)
(providing that the "Secretary of the Treasury may issue a check or other draft on public money in the
Treasury to pay an obligation of the United States Government"). Because the power to tax is
constitutionally given to Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I (providing that "The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes"), Congress at least theoretically would have the power to change
the tax delegation to the IRS, thereby undermining this structure to the extent it is based on tax revenues
as the financial assets. The IRS is just a bureau of the Treasury Department, so Congress could abolish
the Treasury Department and establish a new agency, but the new agency would once again be under the
control of the executive branch. The separation of powers doctrine prevents Congress from enforcing the
law; that power is vested in the executive branch.
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monetize (i.e., effectively accelerate the timing of collection of) future taxes
and avoid default, by selling rights to the payment of future tax revenues.
This interpretation is supported by United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 118 in
which the Supreme Court explained that the President has considerable
freedom to act when Congress has not explicitly forbidden the precise action in
question. Specifically, the Court held that the President could unilaterally
withdraw certain lands from the public market even though Congress had
clearly provided that such lands should be free and open to all. In other words,
a statute that easily could have been read to imply that Congress had taken a
stance against the President was read narrowly to allow plenty of room for the
President to act in the public's best interest. The Court emphasized that the
President's implied authority "all the more readily operated .

.

. in view of the

fact that its exercise was not only useful to the public, but did not interfere with
any vested right of the citizen." 19 This is all the more compelling when
"[e]mergencies ...

occur, or conditions ...

change as to require that the agent

in charge should [act] in the public interest."1 20
In our case, if the President issues an executive order directing the
Secretary of the Treasury to avoid default by selling rights to the payment of
future tax revenues, he would (as before 21) be acting pursuant to an implied
authorization of Congress122 so his authority should be at its maximum.123

117.
The Secretary of the Treasury, through the IRS, has even more explicit authority to
settle and otherwise work with rights to payment of delinquent tax revenues and to collect those
revenues by any means, including compromises for a reduced tax liability. See 14A MERTENS LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 54:141; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7122 (2012) (outlining a compromise
regime of civil or criminal cases arising under the internal revenue laws prior to referral to the
Department of Justice for prosecution or deference). The Secretary of the Treasury should therefore
have even clearer authority to securitize rights to delinquent tax revenues. That, in turn, could also help
to shift risk from the government to the SPE's investors on those revenues.
118.
236 U.S. 459 (1915).
119.
Id. at 475. Although the facts of the case indicated a separate basis for the implied
authority-that the President's action represented a "long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced
in by Congress," id. at 474-the Court did not limit its opinion to that rationale.
120. Id. at 474.
121.
See supra Subsection II.A.I.
122.
One reviewer of this Feature suggested that the Anti-Deficiency Act (of which the
most relevant provision is 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)) might restrict the authority of the Secretary of the
Treasury to sell or otherwise transfer (e.g., grant as collateral) rights to the payment of future tax
revenues. I do not believe it does. In relevant part, that Act prohibits executive branch officials from
committing the federal government to contracts or other obligations for the payment of money before
Congress has made an appropriation for that money (or otherwise authorized the contract or obligation).
A contract to sell or grant a security interest in rights to the payment of future tax revenues is not a
contract that obligates the federal government to pay money. To the contrary, it is merely a contract to
sell or pledge an asset. (Even if it were a contract that obligates the federal government to pay money,
there is some precedent that the contract would be exempt from the Anti-Deficiency Act because the
contract effectuates the Secretary of the Treasury's congressional mandate to pay government debts. 6
Op. Att'y Gen. 26 (1853).) Furthermore, in the case of collateral, subsection (a)(2) of the Antideficiency
Act provides that it "does not apply to a corporation getting amounts to make loans ... without legal
liability of the United States Government," and a nonrecourse loan by definition is a loan that is made
without legal liability for repayment.
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Furthermore, under the reasoning of Midwest Oil, that sale would be made in
emergency conditions (to avoid a government debt default), thereby
"requir[ing] that the [President and Secretary of the Treasury] should [act] in
the public interest" regarding disposition of federal government property.124
Also consistent with that case, the sale would be "useful to the public" by
avoiding the disastrous economic consequences of a debt default.
C. Comparingthe Alternative Options
For both alternative options, the structures begin the same: creating an
SPE to issue debt securities in amounts needed to repay maturing federal debt.
To that extent, they are identical. The differences between the structures are in
their second step.
In the second step of the back-to-back borrowing structure, the SPE onlends the proceeds of its issued debt to an executive branch agency or entity on
a back-to-back maturity basis. To avoid the need for congressional
authorization yet make investors in the SPE's debt securities comfortable that
there will be a reliable and adequate basis of repayment, the on-lending is made
on a nonrecourse-debt basis secured by collateral consisting of specific highquality financial assets. The most plentiful high-quality financial assets that
could be pledged as collateral would be rights to the future payment of
specified tax revenues. The executive branch borrower of the on-lent proceeds
should therefore be the Treasury Department, which has the right to receive tax
revenues (through its Internal Revenue Service) and also the right to use the onlent proceeds to pay maturing Treasury securities, thereby also satisfying its
obligation to pay those securities.
In the second step of the asset-sale structure, the SPE uses the proceeds of
its issued debt to purchase income-generating financial assets from an
executive branch agency or entity. As in the back-to-back borrowing structure,
the most plentiful high-quality financial assets that could be purchased would
be rights to the future payment of specified tax revenues. Congress has already
delegated sufficient power to the executive branch to sell financial assets to pay
maturing Treasury securities. The executive branch seller of the tax revenues
should therefore be the Treasury Department (which has the right to receive
123.
It is also worth noting that the AshwanderCourt seemed to interpret Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution as a federalism provision, not a separation of powers
provision. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936) (noting that the power of the
United States to sell assets was "a matter of grave concern because of the fear that 'the sale and
disposal' might become 'a source of such immense revenue to the national government as to make it
independent of and formidable to the people"' (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION §§ 1325-1326 (1833)). To that extent, one might argue that the Constitution does not
much care which branch of the federal government is doing the selling so long as it respects the
structural limitations placed on the federal government as a whole-for example, that the Treasury
Department shouldn't securitize assets simply to make a profit but may securitize assets in an
emergency situation to pay maturing debts.
124.
See supranote 118 and accompanying text.
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those revenues). The Treasury Department also has the right to use the
proceeds of the sale to pay maturing Treasury securities, thereby (again) also
satisfying its obligation to pay those securities.
As explained above, both of these structures should be legally valid and
constitutional. However, the asset-sale structure may be cleaner for several
reasons. It is closer to traditional securitization transactions, which are widely
used not only in domestic financing but also in financing worldwide. That
would not only be easier to explain in the United States but also should be more
accessible and understandable to foreign investors, who-as explained
below 125-may well dominate the purchase of the SPE's securities.
Additionally, rating agencies and investors will probably better understand the
default risk of the asset-sale structure.126 Finally, the asset-sale structure has
less legal "baggage" because it does not involve any federal government
borrowing.
III. Extralegal Considerations
In the discussion below, I first examine how rating agencies and investors
would likely view these alternative options as a business matter. Thereafter, I
discuss how these options should be constrained to prevent their potential
abuse.
A. Rating Agency andInvestor Perspectives
Investors in the SPE's debt securities will have a single goal: to be repaid
principal and interest on those securities on a timely basis. In assessing the
likelihood of timely repayment of any debt securities (including Treasury
securities and other sovereign debt securities), investors customarily rely in part
on ratings assigned to those securities by rating agencies, such as Standard and
Poor's (S&P) and Moody's. 127
1. Ratings
The highest rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with ratings
descending to AA, then to A, and then to BBB and below.128 The higher the
rating, the lower the credit risk associated with the securities in question as
determined by the rating agency. The rating agencies follow explicit

125.
See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
126.
See infra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
127.
For background on rating agencies and the rating process, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
PrivateOrderingofPublic Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
128.
Id. at 7. Technically, the use of all capital letters, such as AAA, represents
Standard & Poor's credit ratings designations; Moody's uses equivalent ratings except that only the first
letter is capitalized, such as Aaa (the Moody's equivalent of S&P's AAA rating).
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methodologies in deriving their ratings. For example, S&P's framework for
rating structured finance securities considers five key factors: the credit quality
of the underlying financial assets, legal and regulatory risks, payment structure
and cash flow mechanics, operational and administrative risks, and
counterparty risk. 129
Consider how those factors would apply to the SPE's debt securities. If
(as this Feature proposes) the underlying financial assets are rights to the future
payment of specified tax revenues, their credit quality should be good because
taxpayers who fail to pay their taxes are subject to interest charges 1o and civil
and potentially criminal government penalties.' ' Those rights, however, should
be quantified as legally enforceable rights before they serve as the underlying
financial assets.
2. Overcollateralization
Even if those rights are so quantified and legally enforceable, some
taxpayers may fail to pay their taxes. Individuals, for example, may die and
their estates may be insufficient to pay the taxes. Companies may liquidate.
Even though the Internal Revenue Service's claim for payment of taxes has
priority over most other claims,132 some taxpayers may ultimately default on
paying their taxes. To the extent the financial assets underlying payment of the
SPE's debt securities include tax claims that ultimately default, the SPE's debt
securities may similarly default.
To reduce the chance of that (similar) default on an SPE's debt securities,
investors in those securities normally expect, and rating agencies rating those
securities customarily require, the anticipated collections on the underlying
financial assets to exceed by some margin (e.g., 10%) the amounts needed to
pay the SPE's debt securities in full. This is referred to as
"overcollateralization," and it is typically achieved by adjusting downward the
purchase price (in the case of an asset-sale structure) or collateral value (in the
case of a back-to-back borrowing structure) of the financial assets for
anticipated defaults and delayed collections.133 Overcollateralization also can

CALVIN R. WONG ET AL., STANDARD & POOR'S, PRINCIPLES-BASED RATING
129.
METHODOLOGY FOR GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE SECURITIES 2-4 (2007).
130.
Interest accrues on all taxes not paid when due as well as on all civil and criminal
penalties imposed. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6601, 6611, 6621-6622 (2012); 2 WEST'S FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 1639 (2014).
131.
Failure to pay taxes is subject to an initial 5% or 15% civil penalty, followed by
another 5% or 15% penalty for each month that passes, up to a maximum of 25% or 75% depending on
whether the failure was as a result of negligence or fraud, respectively. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651-6665
(2012); 2 WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE, supra note 130, § 1640. Willful tax evasion is
a felony, subjecting tax evaders to up to $100,000 in fines ($500,000 if the tax evader is a corporation)
and five years' imprisonment. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201; 2 WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE,
supra note 130, § 1641.
See, e.g., II U.S.C. § I129(a)(9) (2012).
132.
133.
2 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS,supra note 52, § 8.02(B).
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be-and often is-effectively achieved by owners of the SPE or other parties
contributing some capital at the outset to the SPE;134 that gives the SPE
additional value to pay its debt securities if collections on the underlying
financial assets turn out to be insufficient. 135
Because the party transferring the financial assets is governmental (i.e.,
the Treasury Department) and governmental entities are not subject to
bankruptcy, there should also be considerably more flexibility than in a private
structured finance transaction for the transferor of the financial assets to make
warranties as to their quality. In private transactions, investors and rating
agencies are concerned that strong warranties might undermine the validity in
bankruptcy of the transfer of the financial assets.' 36 In our transaction, however,
the transferor of the financial assets-whether the transfer is structured as a
secured loan or a sale-will be the Treasury Department. Therefore, the
warranties on the quality of the transferred assets can be made as strong as the
parties are willing to negotiate.137
Thus, with sufficient overcollateralization and warranties, and assuming
the underlying financial assets are legally enforceable rights to the future
payment of specified tax revenues, the credit quality of those financial assets
should be sufficient to support a highly rated debt issuance by the SPE.
Another factor that rating agencies regard as key is legal and regulatory
risk.138 This Feature has focused extensively on that risk. Because part of that
risk turns on the nature of the SPE itself, it is useful to make several
observations regarding the SPE. Before doing that, however, it should be
cautioned that most of this Feature's legal analysis turns on relatively thin
precedent and issues of first impression. It therefore would be invaluable to
investors, and rating agencies, to find a legal safe harbor.
3. "Reasonableness" Safe Harbor
In a commercial context, the concept of "apparent authority" creates a
partial safe harbor, enabling parties to rely conclusively on the due
authorization and execution of contracts that appear to be executed by properly
authorized officers. 139 In contrast, however, investors in the debt securities of
an SPE created pursuant to an executive order that appears to be properly

134.
1 Id. § 3.05(A)(3).
135.
2 Id. § 4.05. Owners who contribute capital customarily expect any unused capital
to be returned to them after the SPE's debt securities are paid in full. Id.
136.
See SCHWARCZ ET AL., supra note 87, § 3.03, at 69-86.
137.
Any such warranties on the quality of the transferred assets should be within the
range of reasonableness, of course. A warranty stating that the Treasury Department would pay if a
transferred asset did not collect on a timely basis would not be a reasonable warranty of quality but a full
guarantee, effectively making the loan full recourse. Furthermore, warranties exposing the Treasury
Department to indefinite damages for breach might violate the Anti-Deficiency Act. See supra note 122.
138. See supranote 129 and accompanying text.
139.
See 2A C.J.S. AGENCY § 418.
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authorized cannot conclusively rely on the validity of that executive order (and
40
thus cannot conclusively rely on the validity of the SPE thereby created).1
Nonetheless, as discussed below, foreign investors in those debt securities may
well be able to conclusively rely on that validity.
If it is reasonable for foreign investors to rely upon the assertions of the
executive branch that the executive order validly created the SPE on behalf of
the U.S. government, such investors should be able, under the international law
requirements for attribution of liability to a sovereign state, to enforce the
SPE's debt. In particular, if the SPE's debt purported to be authorized by the
executive branch and foreign investors could show, under usual principles of
agency law, that they reasonably relied on that authorization, that debt would
be deemed to be enforceable even if U.S. courts eventually concluded that the
executive branch lacked that authority.141 International law explicitly
recognizes that apparent authority binds state action.142 This is important
because the "foreign investor community [already] holds nearly half of all
[U.S.] Treasury securities." 143 Therefore, foreign investor demand should be
sufficient to purchase enough SPE debt to enable the U.S. government to repay
its then-maturing Treasury securities.
To enable foreign investors to enforce their claims, the SPE debt (and in
the case of the back-to-back borrowing structure, the debt created by the onlending) should ideally include waivers of sovereign immunity from suit. Even
absent such waivers, however, the United States has, under certain international
treaties, waived sovereign immunity defenses and agreed to arbitration
stemming from debt disputes with foreign creditors.145 To the extent the United
See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 420-27 (1990)
140.
(explaining that estoppel will apply rarely, if ever, against the federal government); Thomas v. INS, 35
F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Estoppel and apparent authority normally will not substitute for actual
authority to bind the United States government." (citations omitted)).
See generally UNITED NATIONS INT'L LAW COMMISSION, RESPONSIBILITY OF
141.
STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS (2001) (defining the situations in which states violate

their international law responsibilities).
142.
Comment 8 to Article 7 of RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACTS, supra note 141, clarifies that "the question is whether [the relevant persons or
entities] were acting with apparent authority." Comment 4 to that Article adds that this "modern rule is
now firmly established . . . by international jurisprudence, State practice and the writings of jurists"
(citations omitted).
Belton, supra note 2, at 1.
143.
144.
Whether foreign investor demand is in fact sufficient to purchase enough SPE debt
to enable the U.S. government to repay its then-maturing Treasury securities will depend, of course, on
market conditions at the time. Compare U.S. Treasury Issuance and Outstanding, SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN.
MARKETS Ass'N, http://sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (indicating that
between January 2011 and December 2013, the Treasury Department redeemed, on a monthly basis, an
average of $565 billion of Treasury securities and issued $646.9 billion of Treasury securities, resulting
in a net issuance of $81.9 billion), with Major Foreign Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ticdata/Publish/mfh.txt (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (stating
that major foreign holders of Treasury securities increased their aggregate position by $18.4 billion each
month, on average, accounting for nearly half of the net issuance).
145.
See Kevin Gallagher, The New Vulture Culture:Sovereign Debt Restructuringand
Trade and Investment Treaties 2 (The IDEAs, Working Paper No. 2/2011, 2011) (explaining that
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States has assets outside its jurisdictional boundaries, foreign creditors might
even be able to legally seize those assets to pay certain international arbitration
awards.146 Foreign investors therefore should have greater incentives than
domestic investors to purchase the debt securities contemplated by this Feature.
4. The SPE
As discussed, the debt-issuing SPE should be organized as an entity that is
not a corporation. Additionally, it should not act as an agency. Within these
parameters, there is considerable flexibility. First consider organizational
choice.
Because organizational choice may be politically influenced, this Feature
does not purport to dictate the outcome. It should be observed, however, that if
the SPE is organized as an LLC, it can be managed like a corporation. 147
Furthermore, a commercial trust other than a business trust, is not generally
legally recognized as separately existing.148 Thus, it is least likely to be viewed
as a "corporation" under the GCCA.
It is also critical to ensure that the SPE does not act "as an agency." There
appear to be two ways to accomplish this: by creating the SPE as a private
entity that acts pursuant to specific contractual directions, or creating the SPE
as a government-owned or controlled entity that does not implement
government policy. The former option is especially feasible. There is ample
precedent for finding and motivating private owners of SPEs.149 Furthermore,
sovereign debt is often an "investment" covered under international investment agreements and arguing
that this gives foreign holders of sovereign debt the right to file arbitration claims in accordance with the
procedures laid out in such agreements). The U.S. government has effectively provided its consent to be
sued under forty-one bilateral investment treaties and several regional treaties, including the North
American Fair Trade Agreement and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement.
See BilateralInvestment Treaties Currentlyin Force, TRADE COMPLIANCE CTR., http://tcc.export.gov/T
rade Agreements/BilateralInvestmentTreaties/index.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (listing the
bilateral investment treaties to which the U.S. is party); see also Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/09, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 384 (Feb. 8, 2013)
(explaining that bonds are considered investments under the ICSID definition).
146.
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 53, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter "ICSID Convention"];
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 4, Jun. 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter "New York Convention"]. If those foreign creditors are nationals of states that
are party to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, which
has over 140 member states, including the United States, Article 53 of the ICSID Convention might
allow arbitral awards to be enforced against member-state assets. Additionally, Article V of the New
York Convention, which has 146 signatory states, including the United States, allows the holder of a
valid arbitration award to request enforcement of the award from the courts of any signatory state. Id.
Those courts must enforce the award, including by attachment of assets of a contracting state, unless one
of a handful of narrow exceptions is met. Id.
147.
See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, I TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 1:11 (3d ed. 2013).
148.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling
the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 574 (2003).
149.
See, e.g., FITCH INVESTORS SERV., INC., STRUCTURED FINANCE NEW ISSUE:
CORPORATE ASSET FUNDING CO., INC. 2 (1992) (observing that "Stone Street Contract Partners owns
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the functions of the SPE contemplated by this Feature, and thus the tasks of its
managers (who should be hired from the private sector), should be ministerial:
to issue debt securities and, depending on the structure chosen, to either on-lend
the proceeds on a nonrecourse basis, secured by specific financial assets, or use
the proceeds to purchase financial assets.
Even though an SPE that acts ministerially does not make government
policy, it must avoid "implementing" government policy to comply with the
GCCA. Some might argue that a government-controlled SPE used to avoid a
federal debt default could be seen as implementing government policy. Making
the SPE both privately owned and privately controlled, however-in which
case, the GCCA's restriction on implementing policy would not apply150
should preclude such an argument. A private entity that acts pursuant to
specific contractual directions is simply not subject to the GCCA.15 1
However the debt-issuing SPE is organized, it should be created and
staffed-and its operating structure, including the back-to-back borrowing or
asset-sale structure, should be finalized-well in advance of a debt-ceiling
dispute. That is critical to enable the SPE to be prepared to issue debt securities
as and when needed to avert default.152 The most time-consuming process, for
example, might involve obtaining rating-agency ratings of those securities.
Because of the relatively high interest rate likely for those securities, I am not
advocating that the SPE actually issue debt securities unless such issuance
would be needed, merely that all lead-time dependent steps requisite to such
issuance be completed in advance.
Other factors that rating agencies regard as key are payment structure and
cash flow mechanics, and operational and administrative risks. Those factors
should not be at issue in the context of the debt-issuing SPE contemplated by
this article. The final factor that rating agencies regard as key is counterparty

100% of CAFCO's common stock"). Corporate Asset Funding Co., or CAFCO, is an SPE with capacity
to issue $7 billion of debt securities. Id. at 1. Stone Street Contract Partners is a partnership formed by
members of Goldman Sachs and compensated, in the author's experience, by a percentage of each deal
entered into by CAFCO. Another way to compensate private owners of SPEs is to allow them to share in
any surplus overcollateralization.
150.
The precedent for such an SPE's validity would be twofold: under Lebron v.
National RailroadPassengerCorp., 513 U.S. 374, 396 (1995), that although policy-implementing, the
SPE is not government-controlled; and under Varicon Internationalv. Office of PersonnelManagement,
934 F. Supp. 440, 446-47 (D.D.C. 1996), that the SPE is a private entity that acts pursuant to specific
contractual directions.
151.
Varicon Int'l, 934 F. Supp. at 440.
152.
This Feature does not purport to address strategic political considerations, such as
whether the President might want the threat of a default to be real-and thus might prefer not to
implement any means to avert default-to exert maximum pressure on Congress. Nor does this Feature
address how Congress might react to an attempt by the President to implement the Feature's
recommendations. In general, though, any attempt by Congress to pass legislation restricting the
President's power to implement these recommendations would be subject to presidential veto.
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risk. I see no need for counterparties, however, in the context of this Feature's
contemplated SPE.1 53
5. Implicit De Facto Government Guarantee
Another factor that rating agencies and investors might view as relevant in
the context of this Feature's contemplated SPE is the possibility of an implicit
de facto government guarantee of the SPE's debt. 154 In public finance, a state
will often have strong economic motivations to backstop the debt of its SPEs. A
default on such debt could signal uncertainty as to whether the state will pay its
debts generally, thereby jeopardizing the state's credit rating.155 For example,
in 1984, Ohio stood behind its water development authority's revenue debt to
reduce rating-agency scrutiny of a technical default on that debt. Markets and
investors likewise believe that the economic compulsion to avoid increased
borrowing costs resulting from a default on state-SPE debt provides an
incentive for the state to pay that debt to avoid an SPE default. 57
Additionally, a state may support payment of an SPE's debt merely to
protect the state's reputation more generally. In a corporate context, for
example, at the outset of the 2008 financial crisis many banks backstopped
their affiliated structured investment vehicles (SIVs) solely to protect their own
reputations.
In the case of Citigroup, this occurred notwithstanding that it
reduced the capital ratio that regulators monitor to gauge that bank's ability to
withstand losses on bad loans 1 59 and caused Moody's to lower the bank's longterm credit rating.160 The reputational harm of not supporting payment of an
SPE's debt may be even greater in a state than a corporate context because
"investor perception of an implicit . . . government guarantee is hard to

153.
In many commercial transactions, the SPE debt is dependent on payments from
one or more counterparties, such as providers of currency swaps. Rating agencies then evaluate the
counterparties' financial stability, because they could constitute a "weak link": if, for example, they fail
to perform their swap obligations, the SPE may have insufficient funds in the relevant currency to pay
its debt securities. 2 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supranote 52, § 7.03(F).
154.
Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 381-83 (observing that, in the state context, rating
agencies give top investment-grade ratings to SPE-issued public debt, partly based on the SPE's
expected cash flows and partly based on the reality that the state will not allow its SPE-debt to default
because that would jeopardize the state's own credit rating).
155.
Cf STANDARD & POOR'S, MORAL OBLIGATION BONDS 3 (2006) (observing that if
a properly structured moral obligation defaulted, despite clear original legislative support, the state's
willingness to pay on its other debt would need to be examined").
156.
1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-032 (Ohio), http://www.ohioattomeygeneral.gov/getat
tachment/6abcda74-25b7-4d01-a3fB-b479aef6dl2b/1984-032.aspx (discussing the issue).
157.
See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 376-77 (discussing the use of state SPEs).
158.
Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate Seven SIVs
on Balance Sheet (Update3), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 13, 2007, 9:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aT01x2iDnZRk (reporting that Citigroup Inc. did this in the amount
of $49 billion, following similar decisions by HSBC Holdings Plc and WestLB AG to backstop their
SIVs).
159.
Id.
160.
Id. (reporting a lowering from Aa2 to Aa3).
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break," 16 1 even by "statutory disclaimers and [prospectus] disclosures" that the
SPE debt is not backed by the government. 162
Thus, for these reasons-to avoid jeopardizing its credit rating and to
generally protect its reputation-a state may well backstop the debt of its SPEs
notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so.163 These reasons
would appear to be less compelling, however, in the context of a privately
owned and controlled debt-issuing SPE, even if the SPE was originally created
by the Treasury Department. A default by that SPE on its debt securities would
be unlikely to jeopardize credit ratings on full-faith-and-credit-backed Treasury
securities. Nor should such a default impair the U.S. government's reputation if
investors receive proper disclosure about the risks inherent in the SPE's debt
securities. That disclosure should prominently warn of the risk that collections
on the underlying financial assets might be insufficient, notwithstanding any
applicable overcollateralization, to pay those debt securities in full and on a
timely basis.
Rating agencies and investors should understand that risk, especially if the
SPE utilizes the asset-sale structure. Recall that that structure is similar to the
structure of a traditional securitization transaction, and investors in those types
of transactions have experience taking the risk of the underlying financial
assets.'" It might be less certain, however, that rating agencies and investors
will understand the default risk if the SPE utilizes the back-to-back borrowing
structure. That is because investors do not always fully understand the
significance of nonrecourse debt. Indeed, arguably partly as a result of that lack
of understanding, Congress included a provision in the Bankruptcy Code that
sometimes gives creditors full recourse against nonrecourse borrowers.165
Because the obligor on the nonrecourse debt is the Treasury Department, some
investors might mistakenly think that the credit of the Treasury Department
stands behind the SPE's debt securities. If the SPE ever defaults on its debt
securities and investors claim they were misled-and especially if the media,
including the foreign media given the likely dominance of foreign investors,
161.
Cheryl D. Block, Congress and the Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the
Kettle Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 437 (2003) (referencing investor perception of an implicit U.S.
government backing of Fannie Mae's debt).
162.
Id. (referencing statutory disclaimers and prospectus disclosures that Fannie Mae's
debt is not backed by the U.S. government). In 1963, for example, the city of Chicago paid eighty
percent of the back interest on bonds issued by the Calumet Skyway Authority due to a "feeling that a
bond default by the Authority might damage the city's overall bond rating." JERRY MITCHELL, THE
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 97 (1999) (citations omitted).

163.
A state may also decide to support payment of SPE debt, even though the state is
not legally obligated to do so, if the SPE operates as an integral part of government-essentially a "too
important to fail" variant of the corporate notion of too big to fail. In a federal context, for example, this
is exemplified by the U.S. government's support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's debt in order to
promote stability and liquidity in the housing markets. Schwarcz, supranote 46, at 382.
164.
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in FinancialMarkets, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 217 (2009).
165.
See 11 U.S.C. § I1l l(b)(1)(A) (2012). That provision would not apply, of course,
against the Treasury Department, which is not subject to the Bankruptcy Code.
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makes a big enough outcry-it is not inconceivable that the Treasury
Department might decide to backstop the SPE's debt securities.166
B. Curbing PotentialAbuses
The alternative options for avoiding default should be distinguished from
the current widespread abuse of SPE borrowing by states. As mentioned, one of
the reasons states engage in SPE borrowing is to avoid violating archaic stateconstitution-mandated debt ceilings. That use, which would be similar to the
federal government's use of SPE borrowing to avoid default, is arguably
legitimate because those debt limits make it difficult for many states to
function.
Admittedly there may be more democratic ways of addressing the
debt limit,168 such as amending state constitutionsl69 or, in the case of the
federal government, for Congress to vote to increase the federal debt limit. But
faced with the reality and consequences of default, SPE borrowing is a practical
necessity.
Nonetheless, SPE borrowing has increasingly become subject to abuse in
state public finance. The most prevalent reason that states currently engage in
SPE borrowing is to reduce financial transparency and avoid public scrutiny.
Even though states de facto guarantee their SPE debt,o70 such debt "is rarely
shown as debt on state balance sheets and, even when shown . . . may not be
easily discernible."' 71 This "lack of transparency can undermine public finance

and also make it even more likely that states will continue to manage their
financial affairs with insufficient regard to their ability to repay their debts."l 72
Sadly, the monitoring insufficiency of states, absent appropriate media
attention (which has been lacking173 ), makes states even more likely than
corporations to use SPEs to hide their debt.17 4
Any federal use of SPE borrowing to avoid default should pay great care
to counteract this potential illegitimacy, including through clear and transparent

166.
Indeed, the reality is that sponsors have often stood behind their defaulting SPEs,
creating the perception of a de facto guarantee. See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text. The
fact that the U.S. government supported Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's debt, even though that was
done because these entities operated as an integral part of government, see supranote 163, adds to that
perception.
167.
Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 378 (quoting from a telephone interview with a
leading public finance lawyer).
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
171.
Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 380. That article gives the example of New York
showing $48.5 billion of debt in its 2006 financial statements but failing to show another $80 billion of
New York state SPE debt. Id.
172.
Id. at 383.
173.
In April 2012, the New York Times accepted for publication an op-ed I wrote on
this topic. To date they have failed to publish it, although they maintain their intention to do so.
174.
Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 388.
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disclosure-not only to investors, but also to the public generally-of that debt
and the federal government's de facto obligations, if any, as well as any legal
obligations with respect to that debt.s75
Conclusions
Even a "technical" default by the United States on its debt, such as a
delay in paying principal or interest due to Congress's failure to raise the
federal debt ceiling, could have serious systemic consequences, destroying
financial markets and undermining job creation, consumer spending, and
economic growth. The ongoing political gamesmanship between Congress and
the executive branch has been threatening-and even if temporarily resolved,
almost certainly will continue to threaten-such a default. The various options
discussed in the media for averting a default have not been legally and
pragmatically viable.
This Feature proposes new options for avoiding default, arguing that
although the executive branch lacks authority to directly issue Treasury
securities above the debt ceiling, it should have the power to raise financing by
monetizing future tax revenues. In each of the proposed options, a nongovernmental SPE would issue securities in amounts needed to repay maturing
federal debt. Depending on the option, the SPE would either on-lend the
proceeds of its issued securities to the Treasury Department on a nonrecourse
basis, secured by specified future tax revenues; or the SPE would use the
proceeds of its issued securities to purchase rights to future tax revenues from
the Treasury Department. In each case, therefore, a finite set of specified future
tax revenuesl76 would form the basis of repayment to investors.
These options should be legally valid and constitutional, notwithstanding
the debt ceiling: neither involves the issuance of general-obligation or fullfaith-and-credit government debt, and the second option does not involve the
issuance of any government debt. Furthermore, based on the similarities of
these options to successful financing transactions that are widely used in the
United States and abroad, the securities issued thereunder should receive high
credit ratings and also be attractive to investors. Because of provisions in
foreign treaties, those securities should be especially attractive to foreign
investors-who already purchase half of all Treasury securities.
These options are not intended to be standard financing structures. Being
riskier than full-faith-and-credit Treasury securities, the securities issued under
these options would almost certainly have to pay a higher interest rate than
Treasury securities. The options should therefore be viewed, and this Feature

175.
The only legal obligations should be on warranties as to the quality of transferred
financial assets. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
176.
In finance, a finite set of future revenues is typically referred to as a finite "pool"
of those revenues.
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presents them, as viable emergency measures, if needed, to avoid a U.S. debt
default.
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